In 1992, Bill Clinton promised that, if elected, he would focus "like a laser" on domestic policy. The Bush administration had overseen the end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the unification of Germany and the defeat of Saddam Hussein. A more peaceful period of world politics seemed to lie ahead--a New World Order. Perhaps because of that, Clinton argued, it was time to pay attention to the domestic issues that Republican administrations had neglected. George Bush's skillful handling of the end of the Cold War seemed almost to disqualify him for re-election. A new man was needed for a new world.
As Clinton's 1992 victory suggests, this argument struck a chord with American voters. But it was soon clear that the "New World Order" that George Bush had hailed would not materialize. The Clinton administration faced the painful process of shaping foreign policy in what seemed to be the "New World Disorder." During the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy had been guided by the broad goal of containing communism. Bill Clinton lacked a similar orienting concept for the post-Cold War world.
Four years later, Clinton has been returned to the White House in another election in which foreign affairs played almost no role. The question now, on the eve of his second inaugural address, is what his first term tells us about the direction he will take foreign policy in the next four years. The record of the first term is mixed: policy has been innovative in some areas, uncertain and halting in others. The administration has, to its credit, developed a framework for post-Cold War foreign policy: promote democracy and exercise leadership abroad while keeping entanglements at levels acceptable to the American public. But this framework remains somewhat wobbly, leaving many questions unanswered.
In some areas, the Clinton administration pursued an effective and consistent policy. It took active steps to persuade Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to give up the nuclear weapons they had inherited from the Soviet Union. Clinton strongly supported the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and also signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban. The administration negotiated an agreement with North Korea to freeze that country's nuclear program. There is, however, a great deal more to be done to reduce the huge stockpiles of weapons built up during the Cold War and to prevent other states--or terrorist groups--from acquiring nuclear weapons. This will certainly remain a high priority in Clinton's second term.
In other areas, however, the administration was far less sure-footed--in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, for example. Clinton withdrew U.S. forces from Somalia after 18 American soldiers were killed there. He stood aside in the early stages of the war in Bosnia at the same time that the European governments were demonstrating their impotence. He did little to try to stop the genocide in Rwanda. These crises most clearly raised the question: Should the United States intervene in every case where U.S. forces might help to prevent widespread bloodshed or humanitarian disaster? The administration concluded in a policy review in May 1994 that the United States should become involved in peacekeeping operations only when that served specific U.S. interests.
Yet Clinton's actions have been more interventionist than this conclusion might lead one to expect. Early in 1995, he launched a more active policy in Bosnia, resulting in U.S.-led NATO air strikes and the Dayton Accords of December 1995. He sent U.S. troops to Bosnia as part of IFOR, the implementation force, thus deeply involving the United States in the effort to settle the bloodiest conflict in Europe since World War II. He has sought to play the role of peacemaker in other areas of conflict, trying to facilitate agreements in the Middle East and Northern Ireland.
The Clinton administration did not devise a single concept like "containment" to guide its foreign policy. The persistence of the cumbersome term "post-Cold War" suggests that world politics today is too complex to be summarized in a single pithy phrase. Yet the Clinton team did formulate some key assumptions to support its policy. The first of these is the belief that the world will be safer if democracy spreads and economies are organized on market principles. This belief rests in part on the notion of the "democratic peace," which claims that democratic states do not go to war with one another. It reflects also the conviction that the United States will find it easier to deal with a world that shares its values.
The second assumption is that the United States, as the most powerful country in the world, must exercise leadership on a global scale. This is not a view that Clinton seemed comfortable with at first, but he has come to embrace it with growing eagerness.
The third assumption is that the United States is not all-powerful and has to limit its actions and commitments to a level that the American public will accept. The United States, moreover, must take its own national interests into account in deciding when and how to act. The watchword for Clinton's policy has been engagement, not domination or hegemony.
The premises of Clinton's foreign policy have been traditional ones: The United States should act in support of American values and interests, and it should maintain the strongest military in the world. During the 1996 presidential election, Bob Dole didn't even challenge these premises; he only argued that he would be more effective at the helm.
Clinton's critics accuse him of floundering in the first year or two, and this is a fair criticism. His critics also accuse him of focusing too much on promoting democracy and the market while allowing relations with the great powers to deteriorate. This is no longer a well-founded criticism. Russia and Europe have been at the center of the administration's policy throughout, and lately it has focused more clearly on relations with Japan and China.
Nevertheless, serious problems remain. Russia, which is deeply opposed to the enlargement of NATO, may be less friendly after former East bloc countries join the alliance. It is also unclear whether Clinton will be able to establish a stable and cooperative relationship with China, which has been growing rapidly in economic and strategic importance.
It is unlikely that the basic premises of Clinton's foreign policy will change in his second term, since they command wide support in the United States. But his emphasis on American leadership in a recent speech, as well as his reported desire to secure his place in history, suggest that Clinton will pursue a more active foreign policy in the next four years. The record of his first term gives a good sense of the basic direction of his policy, but the election campaign did nothing to clarify which specific goals might be more actively pursued.
David Holloway is a professor of political science and of history and co-director of the Center for International Security and Arms Control.
